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INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Matt Sissel challenges the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Act).  The Individual Mandate requires
most Americans, including Sissel, to either buy and maintain federally approved health insurance,
or pay a hefty penalty beginning in 2014.  The Individual Mandate’s obligations must be satisfied
even if, like Sissel, the individual is self-insured and does not want to buy insurance, is healthy, and
can pay for medical expenses out of pocket.  This federal regulation of inactivity—based merely on
one’s lawful presence in the country—is an unprecedented exercise of power that finds no authority
in the United States Constitution, which is why Sissel seeks a declaration to that effect, and an
injunction prohibiting its enforcement.
Defendants United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al., (Government)
have moved to dismiss Sissel’s suit, based on alleged jurisdictional defects and failure to state a
claim.  The Government’s motion is without merit and should be overruled.
As for the jurisdictional arguments, the Government claims that Sissel lacks standing, and
that his suit is both unripe and barred by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act—a statute that precludes
pre-enforcement challenges to “taxes.”  With respect to standing, Sissel’s complaint pleads detailed
facts demonstrating his concrete and particularized injuries that stem directly from the Individual
Mandate.  While not in effect until January 2014, the Individual Mandate imposes obligations that
force Sissel and other nonexempt individuals to prepare now to meet them.  Sissel already has
significantly altered his personal and financial affairs so that he has sufficient funds to satisfy the
Individual Mandate.  In addition to this actual injury, the Individual Mandate also imposes the
imminent injury of compelled purchase of a service that for many, including Sissel, is neither needed
nor wanted.
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For many of the same reasons, Sissel’s action is ripe.  The Individual Mandate will inevitably
go into effect in 2014 absent judicial intervention to stop it.  There are no factual developments that
could take place between now and January 2014 that would help this Court resolve the merits of his
challenge, and withholding review would inflict serious hardship on Sissel (who is making financial
preparations now to comply with the mandate) and to the public as a whole (many of whom share
Sissel’s injuries).
The Government’s last jurisdictional argument—that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act bars this
case—is based on an inaccurate characterization of the nature of the Individual Mandate’s financial
penalty for noncompliance.  As the Act’s history, text, and purpose show, the penalty is just that:
a tool designed and intended by Congress to coerce individuals to buy a service and to penalize
those who fail to comply with the mandate.  It is not a tax and, therefore, not subject to the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act.
Finally, the Government argues that the Individual Mandate is constitutional under the
Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, or the General Welfare Clause.  Not so.  The
Individual Mandate regulates inactivity—the choice not to purchase a good or service (health
insurance.  There is nothing in the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause—or in any
of the precedents that have interpreted them—that sanctions such an unprecedented reach of federal
power.  To the contrary, the Commerce Clause authorizes the regulation only of activity—some
voluntary act or deed that places one into the stream of commerce—and not inactivity, like Sissel’s
choice to not purchase health insurance.  As for the General Welfare Clause, the Government’s
argument again rests on the faulty premise that the Individual Mandate and its penalty constitute a
“tax” that is being impose for the “general welfare.”  As explained above, the penalty is a punitive
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measure whose purpose is not to raise revenues for the Government, but rather to compel individuals
into engaging in commerce by purchasing health insurance.
For all these reasons, the Government’s motion should be denied.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Pursuant to Local Rule 7, Sissel requests an oral hearing on the Government’s Motion to
Dismiss.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Matt Sissel is a United States citizen and a permanent resident of Iowa.  For a period
of time—through August 2008—he was studying to become an artist at the Academy of Realist Art
in Toronto, Canada.  But in August 2008, he returned home to Iowa City, Iowa, to open up his art
studio.  Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief (Complaint) at ¶ 5.  
Sissel currently is self-employed as an artist and markets his own artwork for sale.  He is
financially stable, has an annual income that requires him to file federal tax returns, and could afford
health insurance if he wanted to obtain such coverage.  But he does not have, need, or want to
purchase health insurance.  Since he left the National Guard almost three years ago, he has been
uninsured, and he does not qualify for government-subsidized health insurance.  Complaint at ¶¶
5, 24.
Sissel is healthy, has no pre-existing medical conditions, and is self-insured, paying out of
pocket any medical expenses that arise.  Complaint at ¶¶ 5, 24.  Sissel is not delinquent on any
health-related expenses.  Id. at ¶ 24.  Sissel intends to continue to self-insure because he believes
the cost of health insurance premiums is excessive.  Id.
In March, 2010, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.  The Act contains an “Individual Mandate” provision that becomes effective
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in 2014 and that requires every nonexempt “applicable individual” with legal residence in the United
States to have “minimum essential” health insurance coverage as defined in the Act, or pay a
financial penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).  The Act defines “minimum essential coverage” to include
various public and private health insurance options.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(1)(A)-(E).  Importantly,
applicable individuals may not self-insure under the Act—i.e., they are prohibited from paying for
their medical expenses out of pocket.
Sissel is not exempt from the Individual Mandate.  He is not a Native American, has no
religious objection to the Individual Mandate, and cannot claim the living-abroad exemption.
Consequently, Sissel is subject to the Act’s Individual Mandate to purchase federally approved
health insurance or to pay a financial penalty.  Id.
Unless he obtains “minimum essential coverage” before January 1, 2014, he will incur
penalties for each month he remains without such coverage as required by the Act.  The penalty for
failure to purchase approved health insurance is the greater of 2.5% of the taxpayer’s annual income,
or $695 for each uninsured family member per year, up to a maximum of $2,085 per family per year.
26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c).  Complaint at ¶ 16.
Sissel must act now to make financial plans to satisfy the mandate’s requirements.  Id. ¶ 23.
To ensure adequate resources to comply with the mandate, he has determined that he can no longer
afford to pursue further education in art.  Instead, he has chosen to focus exclusively on the
production and sale of his artwork in order to brace for the impending obligations imposed by the
Individual Mandate.  Id. ¶ 26.
Additionally, he can no longer attend many of the national and international conferences and
workshops relevant to his art profession, because he must reduce expenditures in light of anticipated
new health care costs, or penalties, imposed by the Individual Mandate.  Likewise, his ability to
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travel abroad has been impaired by the mandate’s financial obligations.  For example, Sissel had
planned to tour Europe upon completion of his studies in Toronto, in order to study some of the
world’s greatest artworks in person, but he can no longer afford to do so as a result of the need to
save money for the Individual Mandate.  Lastly, Sissel fears that his personal and professional
reputation will be tarnished due to the penalties he will face if he fails to purchase health insurance.
Id. ¶ 26-28.
Sissel brings this suit against various federal government officials responsible for enforcing
the Individual Mandate in a challenge to the Individual Mandate’s constitutionality.  He alleges that
the Individual Mandate exceeds Congress’s constitutional authority.  He seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief that the Individual Mandate is, both on its face and as applied to him,
unconstitutional and unenforceable. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Government moves to dismiss under both Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.  On a motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept as true all material
allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party,”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
Moreover, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, plaintiff’s complaint need only provide “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2).  A complaint must give the defendant notice of the claims and the grounds upon which they
rest, but “[s]pecific facts are not necessary.”  Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672,
681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “A court may not grant a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim even if it strikes a savvy judge that . . . recovery is very
remote and unlikely.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “So long as the
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pleadings suggest a ‘plausible’ scenario to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ a court may
not dismiss.”  Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
ARGUMENT
I
THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER SISSEL’S CLAIM
The Government argues that Sissel lacks standing, his claim is unripe, and his claim is barred
by the Tax Anti-Injunction Act.  On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must accept as true all
material factual allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff.  Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.  Under this standard, the Government’s motion to dismiss fails:
Sissel has pled sufficient facts to support this Court’s jurisdiction.  Indeed, virtually identical
arguments have been rejected by district courts in Florida, Virginia, Ohio, and Michigan.  Florida
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775,
at **56-76 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2010); Liberty University v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-NKM,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at **11-29 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010);  United States Citizens Ass’n
v. Sebelius, No. 5:10-cv-1065, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481, at **10-13 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22,
2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-CV-11156, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at
**10-14 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010).
A. Sissel Has Standing To Challenge the Individual Mandate
1. The Complaint Alleges Specific Facts 
Establishing Both Present and Imminent Injuries
The facts alleged in the Complaint establish Sissel’s standing to challenge the Individual
Mandate.  To establish standing under Article III of the United States Constitution, a plaintiff must
suffer “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
defendant’s challenged behavior; and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.”  Davis v. FEC,
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554 U.S. 724, 747 (2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  “At the
pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may
suffice, for on a motion to dismiss [the court] presume[s] that general allegations embrace those
specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted); see also Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S.
316, 329 (1999) (observing that “mere allegations of injury” are sufficient to defeat a challenge to
standing on a motion to dismiss); Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *57 (concluding that
plaintiff challenging Individual Mandate had standing).
Sissel is an American citizen and a permanent resident of Iowa, where he currently resides
as of August, 2010.  Complaint at 2 ¶ 5.  Before returning to permanently reside in Iowa, Sissel was
a student at the Academy of Realist Art in Canada.  Id.  He is a self-employed artist, marketing and
selling his own artwork.  Id.
While he could afford health insurance, he does not have, need, or want to purchase health
insurance.  Id.  Indeed, Sissel is financially stable, and has been paying for any and all of his medical
expenses out of pocket since January, 2008.  Id. at 2 ¶ 5; id. at 7 ¶ 24.  Sissel does not qualify for
any of the exemptions from the Individual Mandate, which requires him to buy federally approved
health insurance or, beginning in 2014, pay a financial penalty at his own expense and against his
will.  Id. at 2 ¶ 5; id. at 5 ¶ 15.
The Individual Mandate subjects Sissel to two distinct injuries.  First, since its enactment in
March, 2010, the Individual Mandate has been inflicting actual injury on Sissel, because it requires
him to substantially alter his affairs by cutting short his art education and make financial plans to
satisfy the mandate’s requirements.  Id. at 7 ¶ 23.  In other words, the Individual Mandate forces
Sissel to divert resources now from his art education and career development in order to save money
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for either the purchase of federally approved health insurance or the payment of penalties.  This is
a concrete, particularized, and legally cognizable injury.  Davis, 554 U.S. at 747; see also Thomas
More, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at *11 (“Plaintiffs’ decisions to forego certain spending
today, so they will have the funds to pay for health insurance when the Individual Mandate takes
effect in 2014, are injuries fairly traceable to the Act for the purposes of conferring standing.”);
Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *21 (holding that plaintiffs had standing
“[b]ecause the future expenditure required by the Act entails significant financial planning in
advance of the actual purchase of insurance in 2014,” requiring them to “incur . . . preparation costs
in the near term”).
The Complaint describes, in detail, how Sissel already has had to reorder his personal affairs
because of the Individual Mandate.  When the Individual Mandate and its impending obligations
became law in early 2010, Sissel decided he could no longer “afford to continue his education in
Canada” and returned home to Iowa.  Complaint at 8 ¶ 26.  “As a direct consequence of [the
mandate’s] newly imposed financial liability,” he has begun “selling his artwork, and will continue
to do so, rather than devote his attention full-time to his studies.”  Id.  And his “ability to attend
national and international conferences and workshops relevant to his art profession”—like next
year’s annual conference for the American Portrait Society in Georgia—“has been curtailed because
he is obliged to reduce expenditures in light of the anticipated new health care costs, or penalties,
imposed by the Act.”  Id. at 8 ¶ 27.
Second, in addition to the actual injury it imposes on Sissel at present, the Individual
Mandate inflicts an imminent future injury.  Beginning in 2014, the mandate will coerce Sissel into
buying federally approved health insurance or paying penalties to the federal government.  Id. at 5
¶ 15.  As he alleges in his complaint, and as evidenced by his last three years of successfully self
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insuring for all medical expenses, Sissel “intends to continue to self-insure because he believes the
cost of health insurance premiums are excessive.”  Id. at 7-8 ¶ 24.  Should he fail to comply with
the mandate, he will have to pay an annual financial penalty.  This imminent injury is an
independent ground for Sissel’s standing to challenge the Individual Mandate. Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560 (holding that actual or imminent injury is sufficient to confer standing).
Several federal district courts considering motions to dismiss in cases challenging the
Individual Mandate’s constitutionality have held that plaintiffs with injuries essentially identical to
Sissel’s have standing.  In the Florida case, the individual plaintiffs are subject to the Individual
Mandate, but neither have nor want to purchase health insurance.  Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111775, at *58.  One of the plaintiffs alleges that the mandate will force her to “‘divert resources
from [her] business endeavors’” and “‘reorder [her] economic circumstances.’”  Id. (citing
Complaint).  And both plaintiffs claim the injury that the Individual Mandate “will force them to
spend their money to buy something they do not want or need (or be penalized).”  Id. at *59 (citing
Complaint).  On a motion to dismiss, the Florida court held that plaintiffs had standing.  Id. at
**66-67.   “In short, to challenge the individual mandate, the individual plaintiffs need not show that
their anticipated injury is absolutely certain to occur despite the ‘vagaries’ of life; they need merely
establish ‘a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or
enforcement,’ that is reasonably ‘pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of time,’ and which is not
‘merely hypothetical or conjectural.’”  Id. at *66 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, the plaintiffs subject to the
mandate to purchase health insurance allege that they “will have to make ‘significant and costly
changes’ in their personal financial planning, necessitating ‘significant lifestyle . . . changes’ and
extensive reorganization of their personal and financial affairs.”  Id. at *18.  And in Thomas More,
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2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, the plaintiffs allege that the Individual Mandate compels them to
“reorganize their affairs” and “feel economic pressure today.”  Id. at **9, 11.  On motions to
dismiss, the Virginia and Michigan courts held that the plaintiffs—who allege the same injuries as
Sissel—have standing to challenge the Individual Mandate.  Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 125922, at *26; Thomas More, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at *13; see also United States
Citizens Ass’n v, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481, at *13 (holding that plaintiffs had present- and
imminent-injury standing—similar to that alleged by Sissel—to challenge Individual Mandate).
2. None of the Government’s Arguments 
Against Sissel’s Standing Has Merit
The Government denies that Sissel suffers either actual or imminent injury legally sufficient
to satisfy the standing requirement.  The Government deprecates Sissel’s actual injury of having to
reorder his affairs as a reaction—“entirely within his own control”—to the “remote and contingent”
possibility of the Individual Mandate’s operation.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Mot.) at 12.  If
accepted, the Government warns, Sissel’s claim to actual injury “would render the imminence
requirement a hollow shell.”  Id. (citing Public Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
489 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
The Government errs.   The Individual Mandate’s operation is not “remote and contingent.”
Absent judicial intervention or the near-impossibility of a legislative repeal, the mandate’s operation
is imminent and certain.  Accord, Thomas More, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at **3-4.
Moreover, it is false to say that Sissel’s injury is of his own making.  To the contrary, Sissel’s
decision to alter his affairs and save money now is entirely caused by the Individual Mandate’s
imminent operation, and by the fact that the new law imposes an unavoidable and significant
financial obligation.  For Sissel to reorder his personal affairs in anticipation of this new expenditure
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is, as one court recently put it, a “responsible” decision made in preparation of the Individual
Mandate’s becoming effective:
The fact that the Individual Mandate and employer mandate do not go into effect
until 2014 does not mean that they will not be felt in the immediate or very near
future.  To be sure, responsible individuals, businesses, and states will have to start
making plans now or very shortly to comply with the Act’s various mandates.
United States Citizens Ass’n, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481, at *11.
The Supreme Court has made clear that being forced to make plans now to satisfy a future
legal liability confers standing to challenge that liability.  See, e.g., Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974) (“One does not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.” (quoting
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 n.29 (1923))).  In addition, district courts
reviewing the challenges to the Individual Mandate have held that immediate preparations taken in
response to the Individual Mandate are sufficient to confer standing to challenge that future liability.
Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *58; Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922,
at *18; Thomas More Law Ctr., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416, at **11-12; United States Citizens
Ass’n, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481, at *11.
The Government’s authorities do not support rejection of Sissel’s actual-injury standing.  In
Public Citizen, 489 F.3d 1279, a tire manufacturing group and a citizens group challenged a
regulation requiring automakers to install automatic tire pressure monitoring systems in new
vehicles.  The petitioners contended that the regulation did not go far enough in mandating that
automakers protect against the underinflation of tires.  In defense of its standing to sue, the tire
group argued that the alleged underregulation of automakers would lead to more accidents in the
future than otherwise would occur, and that those injured in the accidents would in the future bring
warranty claims and suits against tire manufacturers.  Id. at 1290.  The citizens group made a
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similarly attenuated claim of future injury based on the increased risk posed by underregulation of
the automakers.  Id. at 1291.  The group argued that some of its members would, in the future, suffer
more car accidents than stricter regulation of automakers would prevent.
The Circuit Court of Appeals first observed that “standing is substantially more difficult to
establish where, as here, the parties invoking federal jurisdiction are not the object of the
government action or inaction they challenge.”  Id. at 1289 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).  The petitioners’ “remote and speculative claims of possible future harm to its members”
could not support standing.  Id. at 1294.  Unlike the Public Citizen petitioners, who claimed
speculative harm in the future from a regulation not even applicable to them, Sissel claims actual
and concrete harm resulting from a law that indisputably is.
The Government’s other authorities—all of which involve standing claims based on
self-inflicted harms not traceable to the challenged laws—are irrelevant.  For example, in McConnell
v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part on other grounds, Citizens United
v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), plaintiffs challenged a statutory amendment to the
campaign finance law that increased the limits on certain contributions.  Wishing to avoid the
appearance of improper access and influence, some plaintiffs planned of their own accord to refuse
the larger contributions allowable under the amendment, thereby putting themselves at a competitive
disadvantage in the electoral process.  McConnell, 540 U.S. at 228.  According to the plaintiffs, this
competitive disadvantage constituted an “injury” sufficient for standing.  Id.
The High Court disagreed, concluding that the alleged injury was not a consequence of the
challenged law.  The plaintiffs’ “alleged inability to compete stem[med] not from the operation of
[the amendment], but from their own personal ‘wish’ not to solicit or accept large contributions, i.e.,
their personal choice.”  Id.  In other words, nothing in the statute prevented the plaintiffs from
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competing and accepting increased contributions.  Id.  By contrast, Sissel’s injury stems directly
from the Individual Mandate; it requires Sissel to make significant expenditures (on health care
insurance or on an annual financial penalty) against his own wish to invest in his education and
career.  See also Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 826, 831
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (plaintiff’s unsubstantiated threat of future injury “largely of its own making” and
not traceable to defendant’s conduct); Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s unsubstantiated claim of mere “increased risk” of future injury
hypothetically resulting from regulation of third party insufficient to confer standing); Sanner v. Bd.
of Trade of City of Chicago, 62 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1995) (alleged injury with numerous possible
causes not fairly traceable to defendant’s conduct).  His present financial undertakings are
proximately and exclusively the consequence of the impending imposed by the Individual Mandate.
The Government also argues that Sissel’s future injury of having to buy health insurance or
pay a penalty starting in 2014 is too temporally remote and therefore too speculative to support
standing.  Mot. at 10-12.  The Government’s argument has no merit.
Ironically, it is only the Government that speculates about “a wide range of
scenarios”—self-expatriation, career change, economic hardship, and serious illness—that might
occur between now and 2014 so as to render Sissel exempt from or compliant with the Individual
Mandate.  Id. at 11-12. No speculation of any sort is required to conclude that Sissel will be forced
to comply with the Individual Mandate or pay a penalty to the Government.  The Florida district
court recently rejected an identical attempt to speculate away the plaintiffs’ standing:
[The government defendants] allege, for example, that while Ms. Brown may not
want to purchase healthcare insurance now, . . . and although Mr. Ahlburg does not
need insurance now . . ., the “vagaries” of life could alter their situations by 2014.
Def Mem. at 26.  The defendants suggest that because “businesses fail, incomes fall,
and disabilities occur,” by the time the Individual Mandate is in effect, the individual
plaintiffs “could find that they need insurance, or that it is the most sensible choice.”
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See id.  That is possible, of course.  It is also “possible” that by 2014 either or both
the plaintiffs will no longer be alive, or may at that time fall within one of the
“exempt” categories.  Such “vagaries” of life are always present, in almost every
case that involves a pre-enforcement challenge.  If the defendants’ position were
correct, then courts would essentially never be able to engage in pre-enforcement
review . . . . [T]he individual plaintiffs need not show that their anticipated injury is
absolutely certain to occur despite the “vagaries” of life; they need merely establish
“a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation
or enforcement.”
Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at **64-66 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
The fact that the Individual Mandate does not become effective until 2014 does not defeat
Sissel’s standing based on future injury.  In Vill. of Bensenville v. FAA, 376 F.3d 1114 (D.C. Cir.
2004), the plaintiffs challenged Chicago’s airport passenger fee, which would not become effective
until thirteen years in the future.  The court of appeals held that, despite the significant time gap,
there was an “impending threat of injury” to the plaintiffs that was “sufficiently real to constitute
injury-in-fact and afford constitutional standing,” because the decision to impose the fee was “final
and, absent action by [the court], come 2017 Chicago will begin collecting [it].”  Id. at 1119
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, the Individual Mandate is the law of the land,
and it inevitably will be enforced through serious financial penalties beginning in 2014.  As Supreme
Court precedent makes clear, Sissel “does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury
to obtain preventive relief.  If the injury is certainly impending that is enough” to establish standing.
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); see also Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (A threatened injury that is “certainly impending” constitutes
“injury in fact.”).
The Government’s counter-factual speculation about what the future might hold for Sissel
does not undermine his standing.  See, e.g., Va. v. Amer. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393
(1988) (affirming the propriety of “pre-enforcement” challenges and holding that plaintiffs had
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standing because they “alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law [would] be enforced
against them”); Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 , at **19-21 (holding that,
speculation about changing circumstances notwithstanding, “Plaintiffs’ allegations, which I take as
true, show that they have good reason to believe they will [be subject to the mandate]”).  As the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Teva Pharm. USA Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1309 (D.C. Cir.
2010), the government “could in principle change its position,” but that “seems extraordinarily
unlikely,” and such “theoretical possibilit[ies]” do not “preclude pre-enforcement review” by
courts.1
The authorities cited by the Government to challenge Sissel’s imminent-injury standing
provide no support:  In Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 736 F.2d 747
(D.C. Cir. 1984), the plaintiff challenged a new rule adopted by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) for interpreting the statute governing gas-transmission permits (the Natural
Gas Act).  Even though the Natural Gas Act indisputably applied to the plaintiff, whether and how
FERC would apply the specific rule at issue remained highly speculative.  Id. at 750.  The court of
appeals held that the challenge was unripe, because FERC’s “bare interpretative statement on the
meaning of a statutory text,” which the agency only “infrequently” applied, imposed no concrete
hardship on the plaintiff.  Id. at 748, 750-51.  In stark contrast, in this case, the Government will
certainly and predictably apply a clear statutory obligation—the Individual Mandate—on all
nonexempt individuals, like Sissel.  Unlike the Tennessee Gas plaintiff, Sissel’s injury is concrete,
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because he inevitably faces the “hard choice between compliance certain to be disadvantageous
[purchase of undesired and unneeded health insurance] and a high probability of strong sanctions
[a financial penalty].”  Id. at 751.
In Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033DMS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89192 (S.D. Cal.
Aug. 27, 2010), the court dismissed a challenge to the Individual Mandate for lack of standing.  But
in that case, the plaintiffs (an employer and an individual) failed “to allege [in their complaint] any
particularized injury stemming  from the Act.”  Id. at **8-9.  In stark contrast to Sissel, the
individual plaintiff in Baldwin even failed to state whether he was insured, and whether and why he
would be subject to the Individual Mandate or its penalty.  Id. at **9-10.  Based on the complaint’s
utter lack of facts alleging injury, the court unsurprisingly concluded that the plaintiffs lacked
standing.  Id. at *10.
In Gulf Restoration Network, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 09-1883-09-1884,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81897, at **22-24 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2010), plaintiff environmentalists
challenged a federally approved “Fishery Management Plan” for permitting commercial aquaculture
facilities.  The plaintiffs alleged harm to their personal and business interest in a healthy ecosystem,
along with their ability to travel into those areas of the ocean where acquaculture facilities might be
built.  The court held that they lacked standing, because their harm was vague, generalized, and
conjectural, and lacked a causal connection to the Plan—which neither regulated them nor required
building of the offending facilities.  Id. **20-24.  Unlike the plaintiffs in that case, Sissel alleges a
future injury that is concrete and particularized—facts that the Government does not dispute in its
motion.  The injury is imminent, because the mandate inevitably will become effective in 2014.  And
the injury is causally connected to the mandate, because the mandate requires the purchase and
maintenance of health insurance, or the payment of a penalty.  Sissel’s injury is also reasonably
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certain to occur, because unless some unforseen superseding cause occurs, he will be subject to the
requirement or the penalty.  “Where the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain
individuals is patent, it is irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be
a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect.”  Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. at 143.
In sum, Sissel suffers both an actual injury—the forced reordering of his personal affairs in
preparation for having to satisfy the Individual Mandate—and an imminent injury—the obligation
beginning in 2014 to buy health insurance or pay a penalty.  This Court should join the several other
courts that, in similar circumstances, upheld their plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the mandate.  The
Government’s motion to dismiss on grounds of standing should be rejected.
B. Sissel’s Claim Is Ripe
The doctrines of standing and ripeness “often overlap significantly.”  Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas
Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 485 F.3d 1164, 1168 (2007).  “Ripeness is peculiarly a
question of timing.  Its basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through premature adjudication, from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.”  Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (citations omitted).  “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon
‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’”  Texas
v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998).  Ripeness turns on “the fitness of the issues for judicial
decision” and “the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”  Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201 (1983).
As discussed above with respect to standing, a pre-enforcement action sometimes involves
a challenge to a statute that has yet to become effective.  Such an action is nevertheless ripe “[w]here
the inevitability of the operation of [the] statute against [plaintiff] is patent”; “it is irrelevant . . . that
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there will be a time delay before the disputed provisions will come into effect.”  Blanchette v. Conn.
Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 143 (1974).  In Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 33
(D.D.C. 2008), aff’d 582 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009), this Court found a trade association’s challenge
to a lobbying law yet to come into effect “justiciable,” because the association was “regulated by
the [law] and will be subject to [its] requirements.”  Id. at 49 n.8.  “When the question at issue is
well-defined, and when withholding judicial consideration would cause undeniable harm, as here,
ripeness concerns pose no obstacle to pre-enforcement review.”  Teva Pharm., 595 F.3d at 1311.
Sissel’s challenge to the Individual Mandate is ripe.  First, it is fit for review.  Although the
Individual Mandate currently is not in effect, it will inevitably go into effect in 2014.  The facts
alleged in Sissel’s complaint establish that the Individual Mandate applies to him, and that he will
be subject to its financial obligations.  There are no factual developments that could possibly arise
between now and 2014 that would help this Court’s resolution of how the Individual Mandate
applies and whether it is constitutional.
Second, withholding review of this case until 2014 would impose a hardship on Sissel.  The
Individual Mandate already has forced Sissel to divert his resources away from career and education
so that he can save for the imminent purchase of health insurance or payment of the penalty.  The
injury is only exacerbated the longer a decision on the Individual Mandate’s constitutionality goes
unresolved.  The mandate creates “a direct and immediate dilemma, forcing [Sissel] to choose
between extensively organizing [his] financial affairs before the [Individual Mandate] goes into
effect, or risking heavy civil penalties.”  Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at **28-
29.  Finally, “the public interest would be well served by a prompt resolution of the constitutionality
of [the Individual Mandate].”  Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582
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(1985); see also Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11175, at *75 (finding similar challenge ripe for
the same reasons).
The Government claims that “no injury could occur before 2014, and [Sissel] has not shown
that one will occur even then.”  Mot. at 14.  Not so.  The facts in the Complaint demonstrate that he
is suffering both an actual injury from having to alter his personal and financial affairs and an
imminent injury from having to make outlays to comply with the Individual Mandate.  The
Government simply ignores the facts of the Complaint, which must be accepted as true.
Next, the Government claims that “any injury to [Sissel] here is far from ‘inevitable.’”  Mot.
at 14.  Again, the Government is mistaken.  Sissel has an injury that is more than inevitable—it has
already occurred, and will continue to occur, so long as he needs to make provisions to satisfy the
Individual Mandate.  With respect to his imminent injury, the Individual Mandate inevitably will
operate against him.  He is a nonexempt individual who does not want to purchase health insurance
(or have to pay a penalty).  Moreover, Sissel has been without a need or desire for health insurance
for three years, has achieved financial stability, and has maintained good health; there simply is no
reason to assume—as the Government does—that an unforeseen intervening event suddenly will
render him exempt or compliant with the Individual Mandate before 2014.
C. The Tax Anti-Injunction Act Does Not Deprive This Court of Jurisdiction
The Government asserts that this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Tax Anti-Injunction Act
(TAIA), 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), which provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.”  Mot. at 14-15.
The Government claims that, regardless of its official label, the financial penalty for noncompliance
with the Individual Mandate is assessed and collected in the same manner as other Internal Revenue
Code penalties—i.e., as “taxes.”  Id. at 15.  Moreover, it argues, applying the TAIA to the federal
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 24    Filed 12/16/10   Page 27 of 44
- 20 -
penalty furthers the TAIA’s purpose of allowing the Government to collect assessments
expeditiously without judicial interference.  Id.  The Government’s argument lacks merit.
The TAIA does not apply here for the simple reason that Sissel’s challenge has nothing to
do with restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.  The financial penalty that applies to
nonexempt individuals who fail to buy government-mandated health insurance is not a tax.
Congress designed and intended the penalty to force individuals to engage in commerce—i.e., to
purchase health insurance—and to punish those who fail to comply.  The penalty was not designed
or intended to raise revenue.  As several courts recently have held, and as explained in detail below,
the TAIA is not a bar to jurisdiction in cases challenging the Individual Mandate and its punitive
penalty.  Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922 at **29-38; U.S. Citizens Ass’n v.
Sebelius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481 at **13-14; Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775 at
**14-56; Thomas More, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416 at **14-17; Commonwealth of Virginia ex
rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 603-05 (E.D. Va. 2010).
1. The Penalty Is Not Designed As a Tax
The TAIA, which protects “the [g]overnment’s need to assess and collect taxes as
expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference,” Bob Jones
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736-37 (1974), applies only to “truly revenue-raising tax
statutes.”  Id. at 743.  A “tax” is “a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the
purpose of supporting the Government.”  United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah,
Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996).  By contrast, a “penalty” is primarily designed to punish or regulate
behavior.  Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992, 995 (6th Cir. 1943).  As the Supreme Court
observed, “[w]hereas [penalties] are readily characterized as sanctions, taxes are typically different
because they are usually motivated by revenue-raising, rather than punitive, purposes.”  Dep’t of
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Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779-80 (1994); see also United States v.
La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (A tax “is an enforced contribution to provide for the support
of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”).
There is no authority—and the Government provides none—for the proposition that the TAIA
applies to penalties or to anything other than true taxes.
The penalty imposed for noncompliance with the Individual Mandate is not a tax, because
it is not designed to raise revenue to support the government.  Indeed, the Act “does not mention any
revenue-generating purpose that is to be served by the Individual Mandate penalty, even though such
a purpose is required.”  Fla., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775 at *36 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995)).  Moreover, the Act lists seventeen “revenue
offset provisions,” and includes a section called “provisions relating to revenue,” both of which
mention other provisions in the Act that are characterized as taxes.  Id. at *38; see Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, §§ 9001-9017, 10901-10909.  Yet the
penalty is not listed among these revenue-raising provisions.  Thus, the Act itself does not represent
the penalty as a tax.
Instead, the penalty is designed only to coerce purchase and maintenance of federally
approved health insurance, and punish nonexempt individuals who fail to do so.  According to
Congress, the unmistakable purpose of the penalty is to add “millions of new consumers to the
health insurance market,” deter people from “forego[ing] health insurance coverage and attempt[ing]
to self-insure,” and prevent them from “wait[ing] to purchase health insurance until they need[]
care.”  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119,
§§ 1501(a)(2), 10106(a).  Congress chose to achieve those ends by requiring all non-exempt
individuals to buy health insurance on pain of monetary penalty.  If the mandate to buy health
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 24    Filed 12/16/10   Page 29 of 44
- 22 -
insurance works as intended, the government will collect no revenue whatsoever, because no one
will be penalized for failing to buy health insurance.  For these reasons, the minimum essential
coverage penalty is not a tax subject to the TAIA.
2. Congress Never Intended the Penalty To Be Treated As a Tax
Not only is the financial penalty not designed to be a tax, but Congress did not intend to
impose a new tax when it created the penalty as punishment for noncompliance with the Individual
Mandate.  First, Congress did not refer to the penalty as a tax in the version of the Act that President
Obama signed into law.  Second, Congress used the term “tax” to describe several other  provisions
of the Act, but chose not to refer to the penalty as a tax.  Third, Congress expressly relied on its
Commerce Clause power, and not its taxing power, as constitutional authority for the Individual
Mandate.  And fourth, Congress eliminated traditional tax enforcement methods for failure to pay
the penalty.  Given Congress’s clear intent, the TAIA cannot be used to bar Sissel’s suit.
Congress considered several alternative health care bills before finally adopting the Act.  As
the district court in the Florida case observed, the House debated the “America’s Affordable Health
Choices Act of 2009 “ (H.R. 3200), which contained a penalty for individuals who failed to purchase
health insurance.  Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775 at **25-26.  This proposed legislation
unambiguously referred to the penalty as a “tax on individuals without acceptable health care
coverage.”  Id. at *25.  The “Affordable Health Care for America Act” superseded H.R. 3200, and
was passed by the House on November 7, 2009.  Id. at *26.  Like the bill it replaced, H.R. 3962 also
repeatedly referred to the penalty as a tax.  Id.  Likewise, the Senate debated the “America’s Healthy
Future Act,” which included an “excise tax on individuals without essential health benefits
coverage.”  Id. at **26-27.
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But the Act that Congress ultimately passed does not identify the financial penalty for failure
to maintain health insurance as a tax; the Act specifically refers to the penalty as just that—a
penalty.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (“[T]here is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty
. . . .”); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(1) (“The amount of the penalty imposed by this section on any
taxpayer . . . shall be . . . .”); 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(1) (“The penalty provided by this section shall
be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary . . . .”).  Congress’s decision rejecting the use of
the term “tax” and adopting the term “penalty” is an important signal that Congress did not intend
for the penalty to be treated as a tax in the final legislation.  Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1134
(“Congress did not call it a tax, despite knowing how to do so.”); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (“Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than
the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has
earlier discarded in favor of other language.”); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983)
(“Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to
enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”).
That the penalty is not to be treated as a tax is bolstered by the fact that the Act imposes
various other taxes that are expressly identified as such.  See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 9001 (excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored
health coverage), § 9015 (additional hospital insurance tax on high-income taxpayers), § 9017
(excise tax on elective cosmetic medical procedures), § 10907 (excise tax on indoor tanning
services).  Obviously, Congress knew how to create a tax under the Act when it wanted to, but it
chose not do so with respect to the financial penalty.  “It is well settled that ‘[w]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 24    Filed 12/16/10   Page 31 of 44
- 24 -
inclusion or exclusion.’”  Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (quoting Russello, 464 U.S.
at 23).  “By deliberately changing the characterization of the exaction from a ‘tax’ to a ‘penalty,’
but at the same time including many other ‘taxes’ in the Act, it is manifestly clear that Congress
intended it to be a penalty and not a tax.”  Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *31.
Moreover, Congress consciously avoided citation to its taxing authority as its alleged source
of authority for the Individual Mandate and penalty.  Instead, Congress relied exclusively on the
Commerce Clause for its alleged authority.  Id. at *33 (“Congress did not state in the Act that it was
exercising its taxing authority to impose the individual mandate and penalty; instead, it relied
exclusively on its power under the Commerce Clause.”).  The Act contains a number of findings
purporting to show that the Individual Mandate regulates commercial activity.  Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, §§ 1501(a), 10106(a).  These findings
all relate to Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, not its taxing power.
Furthermore, the penalty is also not enforced like a traditional tax.  The Act expressly states
that an individual who fails to timely pay the penalty shall not be subject to criminal prosecution or
penalties.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(A).  And the Act prohibits the Secretary from placing a lien or
levy on any property of an individual for failing to pay the penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(B).
“These exemptions from normal tax attributes—coupled with Congress’s failure to identify its
taxing authority—belie the claim that, simply because it is mentioned in the Internal Revenue Code,
the penalty must be a tax.”  Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *35.
Finally, the Government cites Barr v. United States, 736 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1984), for the
proposition that, because the financial penalty is assessed and collected like other IRS penalties,
TAIA must apply.  In Barr, the IRS imposed a penalty, authorized under the Internal Revenue Code,
against a taxpayer who had failed to pay taxes after filing a false withholding statement.  The
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Internal Revenue Code specifically classifies such a penalty as a “tax.”  Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals unremarkably held that the TAIA barred the taxpayer’s suit to restrain
collection of the penalty.
Here, by contrast, neither the Act nor the Internal Revenue Code designates the penalty for
noncompliance with the Individual Mandate as a “tax” for any purpose, let alone for purposes of
TAIA.  “It would be inappropriate to give tax treatment under the Anti-Injunction Act to a civil
penalty that, by its own terms, is not a tax; is not to be enforced as a tax; and does not bear any
meaningful relationship to the revenue-generating purpose of the tax code.”  Florida, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *49.  Congress cannot insulate such a penalty by merely codifying it within
the Internal Revenue Code, only to claim that the TAIA deprives courts of jurisdiction to consider
a legal challenge against the penalty.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) (“No inference, implication, or
presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping
of any particular section or provision or portion of this title.”).  Treating the penalty in this case as
a tax for TAIA purposes would license Congress to shield any penalty contained in any federal
statute from pre-enforcement review, by simply placing it in the Internal Revenue Code.  The
Individual Mandate purports to be a regulation of interstate commerce, and the penalty to be an
enforcement mechanism, not a tax.  The Tax Anti-Injunction Act therefore does not bar this Court’s
jurisdiction.
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II
SISSEL STATES A CLAIM UPON 
WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED
A. The Commerce Clause Does Not Authorize the Individual Mandate
1. The Commerce Clause Power Is Limited and Does Not Authorize
Congress’s Unprecedented Attempt To Regulate Inactivity
The Act identifies Congress’s Commerce Clause power as the source of its authority for
enacting the Individual Mandate.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 119, §§ 1501(a), 10106(a).  The Commerce Clause allows Congress to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  While
this power may be broad, it has “outer limits.”  United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000).
The Constitution created a federal government of limited, enumerated powers, and the Commerce
Clause must not be interpreted so broadly as to “convert congressional authority . . . to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552, 567
(1995).  Moreover, congressional findings, no matter how extensive, cannot enlarge Congress’s
Commerce Clause power.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
Courts have defined three categories of interstate commerce that Congress may regulate:  (1)
“the use of the channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.”  Id. at 609 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  The Individual Mandate
implicates, if anything, only the third category.  Contrary to the Government’s motion, Sissel’s
complaint states a viable claim that the Individual Mandate finds no authority in the Commerce
Clause or any of the precedents interpreting it.
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In every case testing the constitutionality of a federal law under the Commerce Clause, the
law at issue has regulated some activity—i.e., some action, transaction, or deed affirmatively and
voluntarily undertaken by the regulated party.  In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005), the
Supreme Court upheld a federal statute regulating an activity—a Californian’s production of
marijuana for home consumption—because it had a substantial effect on the national supply and
demand for marijuana.  In  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Supreme
Court upheld federal labor legislation because it regulated the activity of hiring and maintaining a
workforce.  Even in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942), which the Supreme Court has
described as “perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, the regulation at issue involved economic activity, and not
inactivity.  In these cases, the regulated plaintiffs placed themselves voluntarily within the stream
of commerce.
In contrast to these and other federal statutes challenged under the Commerce Clause, the
Individual Mandate purports to compel unwilling individuals to perform involuntary acts and, as a
result, submit to Commerce Clause regulation.  The mandate regulates inactivity by forcing
nonexempt individuals who do not need or want health insurance to nevertheless purchase that
service from a private vendor.  Unlike the Raich, NLRB, and Wickard statutes, “the individual
mandate applies across the board”; “[p]eople have no choice and there is no way to avoid it.”
Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *117.  There simply are no precedents that authorize
Congress to compel participation in economic activity under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at *114.
Even the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service2 reported to the Congress that “it is unclear




whether the [Commerce Clause] would provide a solid constitutional foundation for legislation
containing a requirement to have health insurance.”  Congressional Research Service, Requiring
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance:  A Constitutional Analysis, July 24, 2009, at 3.  
Where the Constitution does allow Congress power to compel behavior, it does not employ
the word “regulate,” but other words.  For example, in The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366,
377 (1918), the Supreme Court found that Congress may draft persons into the military against their
will under the power to “raise” armies conferred in Article I, section 8, clause 12 of the Constitution.
But Congress is not given power to “raise” or “cause” commerce—only to “regulate” commerce in
which individuals first much choose to engage.  If, on the other hand, the Commerce Clause were
intended to allow the federal government plenary power to legislate about any activity that has some
ultimate effect on interstate commerce, large portions of the Constitution would be rendered
surplusage.  As Justice Thomas observed in Lopez, the Constitution gives Congress powers to lay
and collect taxes, establish a post office, and do other things that have some effect on interstate
commerce.  But these provisions, along with the rest of Article I, section 8, “would be surplusage
if Congress had been given authority over matters that substantially affect interstate commerce.  An
interpretation of cl. 3 that makes the rest of § 8 superfluous simply cannot be correct.”  Lopez, 514
U.S. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring.).  While this is not the time for their adjudication on the merits,
these arguments are clearly non-frivolous, and do satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) by stating a plausible legal
theory that could entitle Sissel to relief.
Courts considering constitutional challenges to the Individual Mandate are split.  Two
courts—in Virginia and Michigan—have granted motions to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 24    Filed 12/16/10   Page 36 of 44
- 29 -
failed to state a viable claim that the mandate is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.
Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *53; Thomas More, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
107416, at **17-29.  But three other courts—in Virginia, Ohio, and Florida—have denied similar
motions to dismiss, holding that the Individual Mandate was unprecedented and raised serious
constitutional questions.  Commonwealth of Va., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 612; United States Citizen’s
Ass’n, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481, at **15-16; Florida, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111775, at *118.
The Virginia court went further on December 13, when it granted summary judgment for the
plaintiffs and became the first court to strike down the Individual Mandate as beyond the scope of
the Commerce Clause.  Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. Cuccinelli, No. 3:10CV-188-HEH, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *39 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010).
The Individual Mandate represents an unprecedented exercise of congressional power, and
presents a novel issue for judicial review.  In light of this, the relatively undemanding standard of
review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, and the majority view thus far of the courts who have ruled on
the same issue, the Court should find that Sissel pleads a viable claim for violation of the Commerce
Clause. 
2. The Government Fails To Show That Sissel Pleads
an Implausible Claim Against the Individual Mandate
The Government bears a heavy burden in showing that Sissel’s case should be dismissed 
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)—a burden it has not met.  The Government begins
with a lengthy exposition on Congress’s “broad” Commerce Clause authority.  Mot. at 17-19.  As
examples, the Government points to Raich and Wickard—which involved the regulation of
affimative and self-directed activity—as proof that Congress can impose obligations “even on
individuals who claim[] not to participate in interstate commerce.”  Id. at 19.  Sissel does not dispute
that the Commerce Clause power may be broad.  Nor does it dispute that Congress may impose
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obligations even on individuals (like the Raich and Wickard plaintiffs) who mistakenly claim they
do not participate in some way in interstate commerce.  But commercial participation entails activity,
which is precisely what the laws upheld in Raich and Wickard targeted.  The Government’s defense
of broad congressional authority under the Commerce Clause simply ignores the essential limitation
on that authority that is the subject of this suit:  Congress cannot regulate inactivity.  Morrison,
529 U.S. at 608 (The Commerce Clause power is limited.).
Next, the Government asserts that the Act and its Individual Mandate are just another
example of the Congress’s historical regulation of “the interstate health insurance market.”  Mot.
at 20-21.  The Government presents the Individual Mandate as a small piece of  Congress’s
“comprehensive reform” efforts—a law that it claims regulates “[economic] decisions about how
to pay for services in the health care market.”  Id. at 21.  The history of, and public policy reasons
for, Congress’s increasing interference in the health care market have no bearing whatsoever on
whether the Individual Mandate is within its Commerce Clause power.  Ironically, all of the
Government’s cited examples of health insurance regulations, including examples taken from the
Act itself, dictate how health insurance is to be “provided,” “sold,” or “cover[ed]”—that is, the
regulations all target voluntary, commercial activities.  The choice not to purchase a product or
service like health insurance—while a “decision”—nevertheless is, by definition, inaction with
respect to the market for that product or service.  It is only the external manifestation of such internal
decision-making—that is, some concrete action, activity, or deed—that the Congress has, in certain
circumstances, been permitted to regulate.  Commonwealth of Va., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814,
at *39 (“[A]n individual’s personal decision to purchase—or decline to purchase—health insurance
from a private provider is beyond the historical reach of the Commerce Clause . . . .”); see also
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19 (upholding regulation, not of a decision to pursue marijuana production, but
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of its actual production); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (upholding regulation, not of a decision to pursue
wheat farming, but of its actual production).
The Government also attempts an end-run around the Commerce Clause with an appeal to
the Necessary and Proper Clause, claiming that the Individual Mandate is “essential” to the success
of Congress’s health insurance reforms.  Mot. at 22-25.  The Necessary and Proper Clause gives
Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers [including the Commerce Clause power].”  U.S. Const., art. I, § 8,
cl. 18.  It is not an independent source of congressional authority, and it cannot be used as a vehicle
to enforce an otherwise unconstitutional exercise of Commerce Clause power.  United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (the question is whether “the statute constitutes a means
that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power”).  Rather,
the Necessary and Proper Clause “may only be constitutionally deployed when tethered to a lawful
exercise of an enumerated power.”  Commonwealth of Va., 2010 U.S. District LEXIS 130814, at
**39-40 (rejecting the Government’s argument that the Individual Mandate finds support in the
Necessary and Proper Clause).  “If the mere fact that an individual lacks health insurance does not
constitute the type of activity subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, then logically an
attempt to enforce such provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the
Constitution.”  Commonwealth of Virginia, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 611.
Finally, the Government argues that the Individual Mandate regulates individuals’
“decisions” about how and when to pay for health care, and that those decisions in the aggregate
have substantial effects on interstate commerce.  Mot. at 24-29.  It insists that Americans must be
forced to buy health insurance in order to (1) maximize the insurance risk pool and thereby control
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insurance rates, and (2) avoid the allegedly crippling costs to the taxpayer, the insured, hospitals,
and private insurers of having to subsidize the uninsureds’ health care bills.  Id. 
First, as discussed earlier, there is no Supreme Court or Court of Appeals precedent that
comes close to authorizing congressional power under the Commerce Clause over mere “decisions.”
And with good reason:  If Congress could regulate decisions that in the aggregate affected interstate
commerce, then Congress could regulate anything—i.e., “the same reasoning [used to justify the
Individual Mandate] could apply to transportation, housing, or nutritional decisions.”
Commonwealth of Virginia, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *38.  To advance or remedy a
problem pertaining to interstate commerce, Congress could mandate that walkers and bikers
purchase cars, that renters purchase houses, or that vegetarians purchase and consume meat.  Of
course, the Commerce Clause power “is subject to outer limits,” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608, and
cannot logically reach mere “decisions” without becoming a boundless source of power for
Congress.
Second, the Individual Mandate’s alleged benefits cannot cure its constitutional deficiencies.
As the Supreme Court recently noted, “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution.”  Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156
(2010).  Because it lies beyond congressional authority, the Individual Mandate must fall. 
B. The General Welfare Clause Does Not Immunize the Individual Mandate
The Government argues that the Individual Mandate is constitutional under Congress’s
“Power To lay and collect Taxes . . . and provide for the . . . general Welfare.”  U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1.  In support of its argument, the Government contends that the penalty paid by nonexempt
individuals who fail to buy and maintain health insurance actually is a “tax” presumably used for
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the general welfare.  The Government’s characterization of the Individual Mandate is wrong, and
the General Welfare Clause provides no support.
The Government repeats the same error as in its argument that the TAIA jurisdictionally
precludes Sissel’s suit.  A careful review of the history and text of the Act demonstrates conclusively
that Congress neither designed nor intended for the Individual Mandate penalty to be a tax.  Instead,
the penalty is a punitive measure whose primary purpose is to compel nonexempt individuals to buy
health insurance.  United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572 (the terms “tax” and “penalty” are
not interchangeable”).  As the Supreme Court in La Franca aptly observed, “[if] an exaction [is]
clearly a penalty, it cannot be converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.”  Id.
The most recent Virginia court decision rejects the Government’s identical defense under
the General Welfare Clause in a challenge to the Individual Mandate.  It explains:
Although purportedly grounded in the General Welfare Clause, the notion that the
generation of revenue was a significant legislative objective is a transparent
afterthought.  The legislative purpose underlying this provision was purely regulation
of what Congress misperceived to be economic activity.  The only revenue generated
under the Provision is incidental to a citizen’s failure to obey the law by requiring
the minimum level of insurance coverage.  The resulting revenue is extraneous to
any tax need.
Commonwealth of Va., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *51 (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Congress cannot use taxation as a tool for regulating matters that lie beyond the scope of
Congress’s regulatory authority.  In the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1922), the IRS
assessed Drexel Furniture over $6,000 in penalties because Drexel had employed an underage boy
in its factory, in violation of the Federal Child Labor Tax Law.  Id.  Drexel argued that the fine was
not a tax, but an unconstitutional federal regulation of child labor, a matter which fell exclusively
within state jurisdiction.  Id. at 36.  The Court agreed.  Though styled as a tax on profits, the Court
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found that the penalty constituted a backdoor regulation of child labor, an activity then considered
beyond Congress’s regulatory authority.  Id. at 37-38.  Congress had overstepped its enumerated
powers by cloaking an unconstitutional penalty in the trappings of taxation.
The Court adopted similar reasoning in United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294
(1935), invalidating a post-Prohibition federal law that imposed a “special excise tax” on liquor
dealers operating in violation of state laws prohibiting liquor sales.  Id. at 288-90.  The federal
government defended the law as a tax, but the Court determined that it was clearly intended to
penalize activity outside the scope of Congress’s authority.  Id. at 295-96.  The so-called tax
penalized the commission of a state crime—the sale of alcohol—over which the federal government
had no jurisdiction.  Id. at 294.  Since the law served a penal purpose and punished activity that
Congress had no constitutional basis to proscribe, the Court held that the law exceeded Congress’s
enumerated powers and intruded on state jurisdiction “under the guise of a taxing act.”  Id. at 296.
In this case, the Government’s argument fails because the Act  imposes the Individual
Mandate and penalty for the purpose of regulating in an area that falls outside the ambit of
Congress’s enumerated powers.  Congress lacks Commerce Clause authority to compel Americans
to purchase health insurance.  If the enumeration of powers in Article I, section 8 means anything,
it is that Congress cannot accomplish the same unconstitutional end by renaming the Individual
Mandate’s penalty a “tax.”  Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People:  Why the Individual
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, N.Y.U.J.L. & Liberty, Forthcoming, Georgetown
Public Research Paper No. 10-58) (“[If this] theory is accepted, Congress would be able to penalize
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or mandate any activity by anyone in the country, provided it limited the sanction to a fine enforced
by the Internal Revenue Service.”).3
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s motion to dismiss should be denied.
DATED:  December 16, 2010.
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